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COMBINING DELIBERATION AND FAIR REPRESENTATION
IN COMMUNITY HEALTH DECISIONS
JACK H. NAGELt
Among the many controversial innovations of Oregon's basic
health services reform, perhaps the most favorably received was the
state's effort to involve citizens in the prioritization process.
Through public hearings, community meetings, and an opinion
survey, the legislature and the Health Services Commission (HSC)
sought to elicit directly from Oregonians the "public values" on
which the ranking of health treatments would in part depend.
Observers hailed the effort as "an open, public moral debate,"1 "an
experiment with health-care-by-democracy," 2 and "a classic exercise
of American democracy."3 Despite these glowing notices, defects
in design undercut Oregon's participatory process, and it fell short
of achieving all the benefits for which its initiators hoped. This
paper offers a sympathetic critique of Oregon's pioneering
experiment in order to help improve future programs that similarly
try to involve citizens in making vital decisions.
An orientation to the future is especially appropriate because
the Oregon participatory planning process could be the first of
many comparable efforts in bioethics and health policy. The
Oregon Basic Health Care Act requires the HSC to update its
priority listing of health services every two years, and the statutory
mandate of public hearings and community meetings appears to
apply to future HSC reports, notjust the initial list approved by the
legislature in 1991. 4 Oregon Health Decisions (OHD), the group
that organized community meetings for the HSC, is the prototype
for a nationwide Community Health Decisions (CHD) movement,
which seeks to bring "a cross-section of the citizenry together with
health care professionals, state and local officials, consumer
t Daniel J. Brodsky Term Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and
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1 Oregon Medicaid RationingExperiment: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health and
the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 102-49
(1991) [hereinafter Hearings]; id. at 24 (statement of Leonard Fleck).
2 Timothy Egan, New Health Test: The Oregon Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1990, § 1,
at 31.
3 Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, Rationing Care in Oregon: The New
Accountability, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 7, 7.
4 See OR. REV. STAT. § 414.720 (Supp. 1990).
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activists, and members of the academic world in neighborhood,
regional, and statewide forums to grapple with the hard choices
facing health care." 5 Supported by several foundations, the GHD
movement has spawned projects in at least a dozen states. 6 If other
jurisdictions uncritically adopt the Oregon process as a model, its
shortcomings could be unfortunately replicated. Conversely, if
attention focusses only on Oregon's mistakes without recognition
that they are correctable, then the burgeoning CHD movement
might be unnecessarily nipped in the bud.
Nor is the relevance of the Oregon experience limited just to
health policy. In its reliance on widespread, small-scale community
meetings, the Oregon project exemplifies the intensified participato-
ry politics envisioned and vigorously advocated by communitarian
theorists and reformers. 7 Resonating with archetypal images of
New England town meetings andJeffersonian grassroots democracy,
this ideal has always had a strong appeal in the American psyche.
Unfortunately, carried out in a relatively unstructured fashion,
intensified voluntary participation can prove antithetical to the
egalitarian values on which democracy ultimately rests.
The paper that follows is divided into three main sections: Part
I is a general analysis built around four questions that shape
evaluative judgments about citizen-participation programs; Part II
is an account and critique of the participatory components of
Oregon's prioritization process; and Part III suggests improvements
for similar endeavors in the future. To emphasize that my critique
of the Oregon process is not ad hoc, I begin with an analysis
couched in general terms. The problems that Oregon's well-
intentioned enterprise encountered were entirely predictable; any
future community decision program, in Oregon or elsewhere, that
is constructed along the same lines can be expected to exhibit
similar shortcomings.
5 Bruce Jennings, A Grassroots Movement in Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Special Supp.June-July 1988, at 1, 4.
6 See Brian Hines, Health Policy on the Town Meeting Agenda, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Apr. 1986, at 5, 5-7; Jennings, supra note 5, at 1-16; Robert J. Slater, State
Networks for Citizen Participation in Health Care Decisions, NATIONAL INST. FOR DIsP.
RESOL. FORUM, Summer/Fall 1991, at 4, 4-6.
7 Most notably, see BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 139-212 (1984).
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I. GENERAL IssuES IN THE DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF
CITIZEN-PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS
Debate in this area often focusses on whether responsible
governmental entities should or should not enlist ordinary citizens-
unofficial, unelected, and unaccountable-to help shape public
policy, especially in areas such as health care that involve complex
choices dependent on arcane technical information and entailing
life-or-death consequences. Devotees of direct democracy reflexive-
ly answer yes; conversely, admirers of guardian elites and strict
defenders of electoral accountability issue automatic negatives. I
take a more pragmatic position by proposing that the desirability of
any particular instance of citizen participation depends on answers
to four questions:
(1) How conducive is the participatory process to informed
deliberation and stable judgment?
(2) How representative are participants, both of the citizenry in
general and of groups especially affected by the policies at
stake?
(3) How binding are the recommendations that participants make?
(4) For what purposes do officials seek to encourage citizen
participation?
The answers to these questions are strongly interdependent,
whether viewed from the perspective of democratic philosophy or
practical politics.
A. Deliberation and Its Costs
The alleged incompetence of ordinary citizens to deal with
public questions, especially those dependent on technical knowl-
edge, has always been a major argument in favor of reserving policy-
making to bureaucratic, scientific, judicial, or other elites.
Schumpeter expressed the usual doubts more frankly than most:
"the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental perfor-
mance as soon as he enters the political field."8 For this reason,
among others, "democratic elitists" like Schumpeter would confine
mass political activity to the occasional, simple act of voting. In
their view, citizens'judgments about more complex issues would be
dangerously ill-founded and ill-considered.
8 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 262 (3d ed.
1950).
1992] 1967
1968 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 140:1965
If participatory policymaking is not to merit such scorn, then
those citizens who become involved must be atypically well-informed
and willing to grapple with complexities. Either they must possess
previously acquired expertise, or the public-involvement program
must devote time and resources to educating them, or both. Ideal
deliberative processes require people to talk with one another,
speaking their own minds and listening to others so that all can
understand how fellow citizens think and feel about the issue. 9 As
a process of sequential interaction, deliberative discussion inherent-
ly demands more time than potentially simultaneous acts of
preference-assertion, such as voting; and, as the number of active
participants grows, the time needed for all to be heard rises at least
proportionately. 10 Consequently, if citizens are to be involved in
a satisfactorily deliberative process, then those who participate must
be willing to pay substantial costs in time, mental effort, and social
interaction.
B. The Conflict Between Deliberation and Representativeness
Other things being equal, the greater the costs of an activity, the
smaller the number of people who will engage in it. Applied to
political participation, this axiom produces a general rule: The.
more intensive (or costly) the activity a system asks its members
voluntarily to perform, the less extensive their actual participation-
i.e., the smaller the proportion who will act.11 As an intensive
form of participation, deliberation will be confined to relatively
small numbers. Given the other virtues of deliberation, this
prospect would not be troubling if we could count on the few who
take part to resemble in policy-relevant characteristics the many who
do not. Unfortunately, that hope is usually untenable.
Because the deterrent to intense, deliberative participation is the
high cost of such activity, those who take part must either find that
cost easier to bear than their inactive fellow citizens or have
stronger countervailing incentives to offset it, or both. Whether by
design or inadvertence, unequal costs for different citizens are
9 See BARBER, supra note 7, at 175, 202.
10 See ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHOR=TY IN A GOOD SOCIETY
68 (1970). See generally Bertrand dejouvenel, The Chairman's Problem, 55 AM. POL.
ScI. REV. 368 (1961) (offering an example of how the right of free speech may be
limited by time constraints).
11 SeeJACK H. NAGEL, PARTICIPATION 54 (1987). This section generally draws on
chapter five of that book. See id. at 53-68.
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always built into the logistics of participation programs-for
example, the time and place of a meeting may make it harder for
some people to attend than for others. The effects of such details
on differential costs of participation can be idiosyncratic, but it is
possible to make one reliable generalization. Educated, well-
informed persons usually have less difficulty participating, because
they are more likely to know when and how to participate, they can
more easily cope with or even enjoy the cognitive challenges of
learning about complex issues, they are more confident about
expressing themselves in discussion and debate, and their arguments
tend to be more impressive and influential.
If policymaking were always just a matter of finding neutral,
technical solutions to common problems, then disproportionate
involvement of educated persons would be desirable because of
their superior competence. More often, however, policy choices
depend on interests and values that are not universally shared.
Education is statistically associated with higher income and
occupational status, as well as with distinctive cultural tastes. Thus,
policy decisions based on intensive, deliberative forms of citizen
participation will usually neglect the needs and desires of more
plebeian members of the population, unless the process is carefully
structured to counteract the normal bias in favor of the well-
educated.
Just as education biases participation by reducing costs, atypical
inducements and motivational patterns will also spur a fraction of
citizens to pay the price of intensive participation. These patterns
are of three types: (1) special interests, as when an individual has an
unusual financial or other stake in a public decision; (2) "selective
incentives," as when an organization (e.g., an employer) makes
individual rewards or punishments contingent on participation;
12
and (3) zealous devotion to a particular policy, which can have any
number of causes-ranging from ideological, religious or ethical
conviction to mere eccentricity. All these motives will entail
distinctive policy positions, and it is exceedingly unlikely that the
persons they impel to act will accurately mirror the distribution of
preferences among the inactive bulk of the population.
The preceding argument is not meant to deny that some citizens
will take part because of a disinterested sense of civic obligation.
12 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIvE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 51 (1971).
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But even that seemingly most benign of motives is statistically
associated with education (and therefore with social class), with
ethnicity, and with a preference for public-regarding, future-
oriented, good-government policies and procedures-a taste not
equally prevalent among all segments of the population.13 Thus,
on all counts, we can expect voluntary, self-selected participants to
be unrepresentative of the citizenry as a whole.
C. Should Citizens Advise or Decide?
A basic issue to determine, preferably in advance, about any
citizen-involvement program is whether to give participants binding
authority to decide the issues put before them or just to consult
them for opinions and advice. 14 Their normal role is advisory, but
American governments have often delegated control over public
resources to participatory entities. Usually, however, the partici-
pants who actually decide are elected from a geographical or
functional constituency especially affected by the program in
question.1 5  The persons thus chosen are no longer ordinary
citizen-participants, but instead acquire quasi-official status, power,
and responsibility. Confining authority to a relatively small subset
of participants promotes better deliberation, and choosing them
through elections helps make them representative of, as well as
accountable to, the larger population of affected persons.
Deliberation and representation are, of course, virtues that
elected legislatures are designed to combine and from which they
derive much of their legitimacy. From the standpoint of democratic
theory, serious questions should arise whenever elected officials or
administrators they appoint delegate binding decisions to ordinary
citizens, unless the participatory arrangements are both deliberative
1s See EDWARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 234-40, 329-46
(1966);James Q. Wilson & Edward C. Banfield, Political Ethos Revisited, 65 AM. POL.
Sci. Rv. 1048, 1048 (1971).
14 Elsewhere, I characterize four modes of citizen involvement in public
administration: advising, deciding, supporting, and doing. See NAGEL, supra note 11,
at 146. Vroom andJago emphasize that a crucial choice in participative management
is whether subordinates are to be entrusted with making decisions, or merely
consulted. See VICTOR H. VROOM & ARTHUR G. JAGO, THE NEW LEADERSHIP:
MANAGING PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 33 (1988).
15 Examples at various times and places have included elected boards of
community action programs during the war on poverty, local boards administering
federal grazing lands, neighborhood councils disbursing community development
block grants, and district school boards under community control programs.
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and representative-preferably, superior to the legislature on at least
one of these counts, and not markedly inferior on the other.
When citizens are involved in a purely consultative mode, the
tests of deliberation and representation may apply less stringently.
However, many advisory bodies that lack formal authority neverthe-
less substantially affect final decisions. The greater the de facto
influence of such groups, the more we should be concerned about
whether they satisfy both criteria.
D. What Are the Purposes of Participation?
Thus far I have analyzed citizen participation from a purely
normative perspective, but politicians and officials who resort to
such devices usually do so for practical reasons. From their
standpoint, tests derived from democratic theory are relevant only
to the extent they affect the ability of a participatory process to
achieve pragmatic goals. Four such purposes, singly or in combina-
tion, commonly motivate authorities to involve citizens.
1. Shifting Responsibility
When policy choices are especially divisive, authorities may pass
the buck to ordinary citizens. Thus many countries, including
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and New Zealand, have used
referendums to resolve the inflammatory issue of prohibition.
16
In the United States, government agencies have often established
grassroots committees to handle hard choices involving the
allocation of individual benefits and deprivations; local draft boards
were a conspicuous example.
Officials can most plausibly shift the burden of decision by
giving citizens binding authority. Although officials may still share
responsibility if the status of participants is nominally advisory, the
ploy is more successful when citizens' advice is both unequivocal
and heeded. In either case, if the criteria of deliberation and
representativeness are operative ideals in the political culture,
attempts to transfer responsibility may meet with condemnation if
the participatory process seems inadequate on either count.
16 See REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 227-37
(David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978).
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2. Testing the Waters
Citizen participation in the advisory mode often helps officials
devise programs that are substantively acceptable to groups that
have the power to upset plans, or punish their authors, at later
stages-legislative, administrative, or electoral. When citizens are
consulted for this purpose, ensuring that participants fairly
represent the entire population may seem irrelevant or counterpro-
ductive, since the powerless can be neglected with impunity. Such
a cavalier attitude toward involving the weak often backfires,
however. Political power is neither static nor easily predictable, and
seemingly powerless groups may acquire unexpected strength,
especially when the decision moves to a different arena or new
forces enter the struggle.
17
3. Achieving Consensus
The idea that participation properly understood offers the best
way to both build unified judgment and reach amicable agreement
is a recurring theme in the theory and practice of participatory
democracy and participatory management. Although this faith is
especially common (and more often justified) at the small-group
level,' 8 some enthusiasts extrapolate consensus as a goal and
expectation to larger polities. 19 Regardless of scale, participa-
tionists recognize deliberation as the key to consensus, which they
believe emerges only after people fully understand the logic of the
situation, interact empathetically, and engage in protracted
discussion. On the other hand, participationists are inclined to give
short shrift to representation. Because many subscribe to the
unitary assumption that all interests are ultimately compatible, they
tend to see public decisions as a problem-solving process in which
everyone should eventually arrive at the same answers. Superior
competence and special knowledge therefore matter more than
political equality in deciding who should participate.
20
1 
7 See E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1960).
18 SeeJANEJ. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 278-89 (1980); SIDNEY
VERBA, SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF LEADERSHIP 222-25
(1961).
19 For example, although Benjamin Barber accepts the centrality of conflict in the
political process, he advocates "a politics that can transform conflict into cooperation
through citizen participation, public deliberation, and civic education." BARBER, supra
note 7, at 135.
20 This logic is best explicated (but not unconditionally endorsed) by Mansbridge.
DELIBERATION AND FAIR REPRESENTATION
4. Legitimation
A long tradition of small-group research and practical action
supports the "participation hypothesis"-the generalization that
people are more likely to accept change if the persons who are
expected to change take part in deciding what the change will be
and how it will be made. 21 The preceding three purposes, if
achieved, certainly facilitate acceptance, but participatory processes
per se have a legitimizing effect, even when they are advisory or fall
short of achieving substantive consensus. In large polities, a parallel
notion exists in the belief that elections establish consent, both as
constitutional fiction and as sociological reality.22 In an age when
so many people distrust politicians, officials seeking extra legitimacy
for policies turn to citizen participation. Whether or not their
hopes will be realized depends on the perceived quality and fairness
of the process-especially whether all affected groups can be
persuaded that "people like us" had a fair hearing.
All four of the goals listed in this section appear to have
motivated the architects of Oregon's health care reform to enlist
citizens in the prioritization process. Although the planners
achieved a measure of success, difficulties in combining deliberation
and representation prevented them from fulfilling their hopes.
H. THE OREGON EXPERIMENT AND ITS PROBLEMS
The Oregon Basic Health Care Act assigns the biennial task of
developing prioritized lists of treatments to an eleven-member
Health Services Commission (HSC), appointed by the Governor and
confirmed by the Senate; by law, seven of the Commissioners must
be health professionals. The legislature forbids itself from altering
HSC reports but retains responsibility for deciding how much, if
See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 233-51. Sophisticated participationists often
emphasize that true consensus depends on hearing all points of view. Barber
explicitly repudiates the unitary assumption, yet he emphasizes quality of participation
over equality. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, THE DEATH OF COMMUNAL LIBERTY: A
HISTORY OF FREEDOM IN A SWISS MOUNTAIN CANTON 5, 273 (1974). I weight values
differently. See NAGEL, supra note 11, at 66 ("[Elgalitarian democrats must assign
ultimate legitimacy to those methods that encourage the most extensive participa-
tion").
21 This is a paraphrase of Herbert Simon's original formulation. See VERBA, supra
note 18, at 206.
22 On the effect of elections in expanding the capacity of governments to win
compliance, see BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSENT: ELECTIONS,
CITIZEN CONTROL AND POPULAR ACQUIESCENCE 181-85 (1982).
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anything, to appropriate in order to implement the HSC's recom-
mendations. 23 In other words, the legislature can either reject the
report in toto or accept it and decide where on the treatment list to
draw the line.
Before preparing the list, the HSC is compelled by the Act to
conduct public hearings, which are a standard requirement in such
situations. Both the legislature and the HSC appear to have
regarded the hearings as a predictable opportunity for special-
interest groups, which the state takes the trouble to enumerate:
"advocates for seniors; handicapped persons; mental health services
consumers; low-income Oregonians; and providers of health care,
including but not limited to physicians licensed to practice medi-
cine, dentists, oral surgeons, chiropractors, naturopaths, hospitals,
clinics, pharmacists, nurses and allied health professionals." 24 The
HSC dutifully held twelve hearings. Although 1500 people attended
and hundreds testified, the Commissioners appear not to have been
impressed by this routine form of citizen participation. Their
otherwise voluminous report devotes only two perfunctory pages to
the hearings. One tabulates testimony by topic and city; the other
offers the sketchiest of accounts and this conclusion:
Testimony generally was not useful in measuring treatment
effectiveness objectively but was useful for understanding the
general tone of public needs and concerns. The message was
delivered that dental, preventive and mental health care and
chemical dependency services should be a part of the health
services available.
25
As does everyone else interested in the Oregon reform, the
Commission devotes far more attention to the two more novel
components of its public participation program, community
meetings and a telephone survey.
A. Community Meetings and the Problem of Representation
Like the hearings, these sessions were mandated by the Act,
though in much more positive and hopeful language: "[T]he
Commission shall actively solicit public involvement in a community
meeting process to build a consensus on the values to be used to
23 See OR. REV. STAT. § 414.720 (Supp. 1990).
24 Id. § 414.720(1).
25 OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, THE 1991 PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH
SERVICES app. E at 1 (1991) [hereinafter OHSC, PRIORITIZATION].
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guide health resource allocation decisions." 26 To organize the
community meetings, the HSC engaged Oregon Health Decisions
(OHD), a nonprofit organization that serves as a model for the
nationwide community health decisions movement. Founded in
1982, OHD attracted 5000 participants to 300 meetings during 1983
and 1984, culminating in a Citizens Health Care Parliament in
October of 1984.27 OHD's efforts undoubtedly had a significant
influence on the Oregon Basic Health Care Act, including the
provision for community meetings.
In early 1990, OHD organized forty-seven meetings ranging in
size from three to 120 persons, with a total attendance of 1048
citizens. 28 Each meeting lasted at least two hours and followed a
standard format. The first half hour was devoted to an informative
briefing, including a slide show. For the next hour, participants
were divided (if necessary) into discussion groups of six to ten
members. Led by trained volunteer facilitators, the groups warmed
up by discussing eight prototypical cases of individuals in need of
health services. They were then asked collectively to classify nine
sample health care categories into three priority groups-essential,
very important, and important.29 In the last half hour, the small
groups reported their judgments to a plenary gathering. OHD
compiled facilitators' reports of the frequency with which various
values were discussed in this last stage of the forty-seven meetings
in order to derive a ranking of thirteen values "Oregonians want the
Health Services Commission to use in guiding the process of
prioritizing health care services."30 Prevention and quality of life
topped the list; length of life and personal responsibility (for health
problems) were at the bottom.
31
The HSC originally had hoped to ask attendees at community
meetings to fill out a survey that would yield quantifiable data about
health values and service preferences. OHD recommended instead
that the two-hour meetings be reserved for the interactive "consen-
26 OR. REV. STAT. § 414.720(2) (Supp. 1990).27 See Hines, supra note 6, at 5.
28 See OREGON HEALTH DECISIONS, HEALTH CARE IN COMMON: REPORT OF THE
OREGON HEALTH DECISIONS COMMUNITY MEETINGS PROCESS (1990), in OHSC,
PRIORITIZATION, supra note 25, app. F at 5.
29 Categories included: "Treatment of conditions which are fatal and can't be
cured;" "Treatment for alcoholism or drug addiction;" and "Preventive care which
definitely can prevent early death or a reduction in quality of life." Id app. A.
3 0 Id. at 5.
31 Id. at 5-6.
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sus building" process. 32 The decision not to use the community
meetings as a source of more definite and therefore possibly
binding data was fortunate, because, as both OHD and the HSC
frankly disclose, the community meetings failed to attract anything
like a representative sample, either of Oregonians in general or of
people most affected by the Medicaid reform.
As might have been predicted from the general analysis of
intensive participation sketched in the preceding section, most
participants at these "grassroots" meetings were well-educated and
occupationally involved with health care. Two-thirds were college
graduates, and another 22% had some college education.3 3  No
fewer than 69.2% were mental health and health care workers.
3 4
Over a third (34%) had incomes of $50,000 or more, whereas only
about 8% of participants were below the federal poverty level,
compared with 11% of Oregon's population.35 Potential beneficia-
ries of the reform-the uninsured-numbered just 9.4%, and current
Medicaid recipients were only 4.4%; all other participants had
medical insurance.
3 6
B. The Telephone Survey and the Problem of Deliberation
The HSC evidently recognized the drawbacks of the unrepresen-
tative turnout at the community meetings. They also continued to
hope that public participation could yield more definitive data that
would relieve them of the responsibility for making value decisions-
a prudent tack, as the predominance of health professionals on the
Commission otherwise made it politically vulnerable to charges of
favoring providers. Acting now on their own initiative rather than
in accordance with statutory instructions, the HSC commissioned a
telephone survey.
Contacted through random-digit dialing, 1001 Oregonians
responded to a seventy-seven-item questionnaire. The key section
32 See OHSC, PRioRmzATIoN, supra note 25, at 9.
33 See OREGON HEALTH DECISIONS, supra note 28, at 30.
34 See id. at 29. Persons working in the mental health and chemical dependency
(MHCD) fields turned out in force, probably because they wanted the plan to cover
their services. The Commission responded by recommending that the legislature
include MHCD representatives on the Commission in the future and integrate MHCD
services into the prioritized list for 1993-95. For a lengthy supplement to the HSC
report suggesting how this might be done, see OHSC, PRIORrrIZATION, supra note 25,
at ap. H.
See OHSC, PRIORITZATION, supra note 25, app. C at 3.
36 See OREGON HEALTH DECISIONS, supra note 28, at 29-30.
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of the survey consisted of thirty-one hypothetical health outcomes,
which respondents were asked to rate on a Quality of Well Being
(QWB) scale from 0 ("as bad as death") to 100 ("the situation
describes good health"). Each outcome represented a different
combination of twenty-three symptoms and six categories of
functional impairment.37 By assuming that the overall scores for
outcomes were an additive function of underlying values for
symptoms and impairments, the Commission calculated "weighting
factors" for each symptom and impairment category. The relevant
weights were then added together to obtain QWB scores for health
outcomes represented as combinations of symptoms and impair-
ments.
3 8
In its first attempt to develop a prioritized list of condition-
treatment (CT) pairs (which at that point numbered nearly 2000),
the HSC used a mathematical cost-benefit formula in which QWB
scores derived from the survey defined the degree of benefit
associated with treatment outcomes. 39 This ingenious attempt to
incorporate "public values" into a technocratic algorithm failed.
Because numerous rankings defied common sense, the "[d]eeply
embarrassed" Commission "hastily withdrew" the computer-
generated list.40 "'I looked at the first two pages of that list and
threw it in the trash can,'" said one member.
41
17 For example, item D involved functional and physical impairment but no
symptoms: "You can be taken anywhere, but have to be in bed or in a wheelchair
controlled by someone else, need help to eat or go the bathroom, but have no other
health problems." OHSC, PRIORITIZATION, supra note 25, app. C at 14. By contrast,
item M combined a severe symptom with the absence of functional, physical, or social
impairments: "You can go anywhere and have no limitations on physical or other
activity, but have a bad burn over large areas of your body." Id. at 15. Apparently,
the survey designers were untroubled by the improbability of the latter combination.
We have no way of knowing whether respondents were similarly willing to suspend
disbelief.
38 For example, the QWB score for a heart attack victim who survives but
continues to experience frequent chest pain is 0.747, which is the sum of 1.0 (return
to former state of health) plus -0.253 (the weight for chest pain). See id. app. D at 4;
see also id. app. C at 5 (describing the general QWB methodology).
" Another key input to the cost-benefit analysis came from panels of physicians,
who supplied probabilities of outcomes conditional on treatments. See id. app. D at
17-18.
40 Virginia Morell, Oregon Puts Bold Health Plan on Ice, 249 Scd. 468, 468 (1990).
41 See id. (quoting Harvey Klevit). Oft-cited examples of perverse priorities
include treatments for thumb-sucking and acute headaches outranking those for cystic
fibrosis, viral pneumonia, and AIDS. See id.; Timothy Egan, Oregon Shakes Up
Pioneering Health Plan for the Poor, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1991, at A12; Bruce C.
Vladeck, Unhealthy Rations, THE AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1991, at 101, 102.
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Although explanations for these unacceptable results emphasize
faulty cost data, QWB weights derived from the survey also provide
a shaky foundation for such an important decision. As the HSC
report notes, the Oregon results for three impairment states and
two symptoms differ substantially from those previously obtained
elsewhere by researchers who used interviews rather than telephone
surveys. 42  The Quality-of-Well-Being questionnaire is difficult
enough to answer at one's leisure using pencil and paper, with the
ability to compare and revise answers. It is hard to imagine that
citizens having no advance preparation can maintain consistent,
well-considered responses when they attempt to scale thirty-one
complicated items presented sequentially over the telephone. Thus,
even if there were no conceptual objections to the QWB and cost-
benefit methodologies, the survey data would have been question-
able because respondents had insufficient opportunity to deliberate.
Having failed in its attempt to shift responsibility for value
judgments to this novel mechanism for making citizen-participants
decisive, the Commissioners fell back on a mixed process in which
their own judgment played a significant role. After consolidating
the CT pairs down to 709, they devised and ranked seventeen
categories of health services, an approach that, in the Commission's
words, allowed the HSC "to take into account the full range of
values expressed at community meetings and public hearings."
43
The category rankings do reflect the values most often expressed at
community meetings: prevention and quality of life. Five of the top
nine categories were for various preventive services, and the lowest
priorities went to conditions for which available treatments offer
minimal or no improvements in quality of life.44
After sorting CT pairs into categories, the HSC applied its "net-
benefit" formula to rank pairs within categories.45 Here, as one
component of the net-benefit analysis, QWB weights from the
telephone survey came into play again, but only as part of the
second criterion of a lexicographic ordering in which categorization
came first.46 Even this modest influence was substantially diluted
42 See OHSC, PRIORTZATION, supra note 25, app. C at 11. The QWB technique
was based on the work of Dr. Robert M. Kaplan and his collaborators. See id.
43 Id. at 15.
44 See id. at 18-19.
45 See id. app. D at 23-24. The HSC calls its version of cost benefit a "net benefit
value" because it omits economic (but not QWB) costs associated with failure to treat,
though it does include economic costs of treatment. See id. at 2.
46 See id. app. D at 26-27.
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in the final stage of prioritization, when the HSC conducted a line-
by-line review. Applying their own judgments of "reasonable-
ness," 47 the Commissioners moved 40% of the CT pairs up or
down at least fifty places. 48 According to a review by the Congres-
sional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the two most
important determinants of where CT pairs finally ended up were the
categories to which they were assigned and the Commissioners'
judgments in the final review, which "overshadowed the initial net-
benefit-based rankings" within categories.
49
C. Political Effects of Oregon's Participation Process
By normal political standards, Oregon's prioritization program
was a success. The HSC's second list was widely viewed as reason-
able; even severe critics of the program found it an improvement
over the first attempt.50 The state legislature accepted the Com-
mission's report and appropriated an extra $33 million for Medicaid
so that 85% of treatments on the list could be covered.51 Within
the state and before Congress, the reform won backing from an
impressively broad and diverse coalition, including the Associated
Oregon Industries, the Oregon AFL-CIO, the Oregon Association
of Hospitals, the Oregon Medical Association, and the state's entire
congressional delegation.
52
Nevertheless, the political consequences of the program fell
short of the more ambitious objectives of its architects. Despite its
attempt at an inclusive consensus, the process failed to satisfy all
potential opponents. Although critics had a weak base within
Oregon, they had powerful champions in Washington, with the
result that the fate of Oregon's waiver application remains uncer-
tain.
Instead of universally legitimating the program, the defects of
the participation process provided opponents with openings that
they exploited vigorously. One commentator called "[t]he Oregon
proposal ... an experiment, applying ... the opinions of eleven
Commission members... [to] life-and-death decisions for hundreds
7 See id. app. D at 28.
48 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 177.
49 See id. at 175-76 (testimony of Clyde J. Behney, Health Program Manager,
OTA).
50 See id. at 38 (statement of Families USA).
51 See id. at 74 (statement of Oregon Governor Barbara Roberts).
52 See id.
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of thousands of poor Oregonians." 53 A representative of the
Oregon Human Rights Coalition noted that her group has "very
little confidence in the fairness of a list which was based ultimately
on the personal experiences and judgment of the 11 members of the
Oregon Health Services Commission."5 4 The HSC, critics alleged,
is "dominated by health professionals" 55 who would deprive "non-
consenting poor women and children" of "medically necessary care
and services" 56 in "a scheme that preys on [their] limited political
clout."57 Children's rights advocates argued that "[tio ask 1,000
healthy upper middle class people with no risk to their benefits what
they'd take away and when they'd pull the plug is silly. And how
many poor children were at those meetings?" 58 In short, Oregon
imposed "a line drawn by us for them.
" 59
The legislature, the Commission, and their advisors had
awkwardly straddled the basic participatory dilemma. One part of
their program was deliberative but not representative; the other was
representative but not deliberative; and the two combined to
influence the final list in a way that, although mysterious, was
obviously not decisively authoritative.
III. SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE COMMUNITY DECISIONS PROGRAMS
If the community health decisions movement and similar citizen-
participation projects are to achieve the elusive combination of
deliberation and fair representation, they must accept two guiding
principles.
First, whenever the goal is to determine "the values of the
people," and especially when those values are to play a decisive or
strongly influential role in public policy, participants must be
systematically chosen to meet representational goals. Voluntary, self-
selected participants will invariably overrepresent better-educated,
higher-status members of society and groups with special interests
53 Id. at 49 (letter of Bishop James W. Malone, Chairman, Domestic Policy
Committee, U.S. Catholic Conference).
5 Id. at 110 (statement of Anita Hendrix, Oregon Human Rights Coalition).
55 Vladeck, supra note 41, at 101.
56 Hearings, supra note 1, at 49 (letter of Bishop James W. Malone).
57 Id. at 56 (statement of Senator Albert Gore, Jr.).
58 Lawrence D. Brown, The National Politics of Oregon's Rationing Plan, HEALTH
AFF., Summer 1991, at 28, 40 (quoting Sara Rosenbaum of the Children's Defense
Fund).
59 CharlesJ. Dougherty, SettingHealth Care Priorities: Oregon's Next Steps, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Supp. May-June 1991, at 5, 5 (summarizing arguments of opponents).
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in the policy at stake. This is not to say that such persons should be
denied the opportunity to express views. Public hearings and other
open forums remain essential, both so people will not feel excluded
and so officials can realistically assess political forces. But if any
part of the citizen-participation process is to have binding authority
or special influence-as the Oregon community forums and
telephone survey did-then those participants must be selected using
a well-structured, consciously designed framework.
Second, to ensure that the persons thus selected will consent to
take part in an intensive, deliberative process, participants must be
compensated for their time, earnings foregone, and other costs. Tech-
niques for selecting representative samples have been highly
developed in survey research, but respondents in ordinary polls are
uncompensated volunteers. Too much cannot be asked of them, or
else the response rate falls and answers obtained are of questionable
quality, as in the Oregon telephone survey. If persons invited to
take part in an important, interesting process are also protected
against material losses and (if necessary) given modest incentives,
then it should be possible to induce reasonably representative
samples to engage in satisfactorily deliberative efforts.
As examples of how representation and deliberation might be
combined, I sketch below two possibilities. Neither is original. My
modest purpose is only to help disseminate good ideas in a context
where they might be helpful.
A. Focus Groups to Represent Specially Affected Groups
Focus groups are carefully selected small groups that meet face-
to-face under the guidance of a trained moderator. 60 Their small
size (usually eight to twelve members) and extended meeting times
(up to two hours or more) enable them to engage in genuine
discussion.61 Participants are normally compensated up to $75 per
session and often receive help with travel and babysitting.
62
Originally derived from the "focussed interview" technique
developed during World War II by the renowned sociologist Robert
60 see generally DAVID W. STEWART & PREM N. SHAMDASANI, Focus GROUPS:
THEORYAND PRACTICE (1990) (supplying a good, clear introduction to focus groups);
R.E. Petersen, Consumer Participation in Health Care Decision Making in Oregon:
Evolution, The Current Situation and Ideas for the Next Step (January 1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
61 See STEWART & SHAMDASANI, supra note 60, at 17.
62 See Petersen, supra note 60, at 13-14.
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K. Merton, focus groups have become a standard, widely used
method in marketing and political research.
6 3
Because they are too small to constitute an adequate sample of
a diverse population, focus groups are used mainly to generate
qualitative insights that can then be tested with larger samples using
less intensive, more quantifiable techniques. If, however, the
problem is well-defined and the groups are drawn from a relatively
homogeneous population of interest, focus groups alone may suffice
to test a proposition.
6 4
How might focus groups function in future versions of the
Oregon prioritization process? Discussion in such groups is less
inhibited when participants have similar socioeconomic status, and
research shows that lower-status persons have less influence in
mixed-status groups.65  Therefore, focus groups would have
greatest value in exploring the desires of specially affected, lower-
status groups. The two obvious categories from which separate
focus groups could be drawn are current Medicaid recipients who
are putative losers in the reform and the uninsured who stand to
gain coverage. Oregon State SenatorJohn Kitzhaber, chief sponsor
of the Oregon plan, described the latter group as "[t]he people who
really don't have a voice in this issue" because they neither
participate nor have strong advocates.6 6 Appropriate focus groups
could help give them the voice they lack.
Such groups might be convened at three stages in the process.
First, at the very beginning, they could be probed to learn if
affected groups have distinctive values or special concerns that
might be taken into account by program planners, providers, and
forums representing the general public. Second, if scales such as
ranked health-service categories or QWB weights are derived from
broader samples, focus groups representing specially affected
populations might be asked the same questions to test whether their
values are indeed similar. 67  Finally, once a prioritized list is
63 See id. at 9-10. On the history of focus groups, see generally Robert K. Merton,
The Focussed Interview and Focus Groups: Continuities and Discontinuities, 51 PUB.
OPINION Q. 550 (1987).
6 See STEWART & SHAMDASANI, supra note 60, at 17.
65 See id. at 38, 45.
66Julie Kosterlitz, Rationing Health Care, 22 NAT'LJ. 1590, 1592 (1990).
67 While noting that the small number of low-income participants was "perhaps
our chief concern," OHD President Richard H. Grant emphasized that meetings that
were attended by larger numbers of poor people showed "no striking differences in
values discussed." Hearings, supra note 1, at 150. On a county basis, however, the
percentage of Medicaid recipients attending meetings never exceeded 14.3% and the
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complete, the affected groups might be asked their reactions to the
proposed reform as it affects them.
This last possibility is especially intriguing. As Stewart and
Shamdasani point out, one good use of focus groups is to test
whether program planners are right in believing they know what
their clients want or should need.68 The debate over the Oregon
waiver application contains much fruitless argument over whether
Medicaid recipients are really helped or hurt by the reform. The
plan deprives them of treatment for numerous conditions ranging
from myasthenia gravis to varicose veins, with the possibility that
coverage will contract still further in the future; on the other hand,
the plan provides valuable new benefits-including expanded
hospitalization, preventive services for adults, dental services,
mammograms, and hospice care-plus perhaps most significantly,
the security of continued basic coverage if their incomes rise or
their children pass the age of dependency. 69 As ethicist Leonard
Fleck observes, "the most powerful moral consideration that could
be used to justify" the Oregon program would be provided if the
poor themselves autonomously chose the reform over the status
quo.70 Yet apparently no one thought to pose this question to
them. Focus groups of recipients could provide an ideal vehicle for
doing so, and if used in this way they might even resolve the
strongest objections to Oregon's waiver request.
B. DARBs: Establishing Deliberative Assemblies
on a Random Basis
Because of their small numbers, focus groups can never reliably
represent a large diverse population. For this purpose, we need
new hybrid devices that simultaneously offer representation and
deliberation-a merger, in effect, of the HSG's telephone survey and
community forums. In recent years, political theorists have
advanced several proposals designed to achieve such a synthesis.
Because the particular labels and details of these proposals vary, I
largest turnout of uninsured persons wasjust 50%. See OREGON HEALTH DECISIONS,
supra note 28, at 28-29. Given the usual dynamics of mixed-status groups, we cannot
be confident that distinctive concerns of poorer people were sufficiently heard.68 See STEWART & SHAMDASANI, supra note 60, at 103.
69 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 73 (statement of Governor Barbara Roberts); id.
at 135-36 (testimony of Representative Ron Wyden); id. at 179 (testimony of Clyde
J. Behney).
70 See id. at 242 (letter from Leonard M. Fleck to Henry A. Waxman and Ronald
Wyden (Sept. 11, 1991)).
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propose the generic acronym DARB for "deliberative assembly on
a random basis."
71
One of the earliest DARB plans is Robert Dahl's "minipopulus,"
a paid advisory panel of about 1000 citizens chosen by the same
means as public opinion polls. With the help of a scientific advisory
board and an administrative staff, members of the minipopulus
would study difficult technical policies, such as the control of
nuclear weapons, for as long as a year.72 They would stay in their
home communities but would be connected through telecommuni-
cations and perhaps occasional assemblies. Although the minipop-
ulus would not have binding authority, its purpose would be to
advise the legislature by "reflect[ing] public opinion at a higher level
of competence."
Ts
Recently, James Fishkin proposed that a DARB of briefer
duration be employed to influence Presidential nomination contests.
His "deliberative opinion poll" would consist of about 600 citizens,
chosen by standard sampling methods and offered sufficient
compensation to gather for a long weekend in a single site. There,
acting as "a national caucus" or a sort of "giant focus group," they
would interact with Presidential candidates through forums,
discussion, debates, and informal gatherings. At the end of three
days, members of the deliberative poll would express their opinions
about issues and candidates. Although unofficial, Fishkin hopes
these results would influence opinion leaders, politicians, and the
general public as the expression of "a microcosm of the entire
nation [given] the opportunities for thoughtful interaction and
opinion formation that are normally restricted to small-group
democracy.
"74
Applied to the Oregon prioritization problem, the DARB
concept need not entail so great a commitment of time as Fishkin's
proposal, let alone Dahl's. If two hours were the minimum time for
community forums, a half day or at most one full day should suffice
71 By a fortunate coincidence, "darb" is Canadian slang for "something considered
especially excellent or outstanding." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 335 (William Morris ed., 1970).
72 ROBERT A. DAHL, CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: DEMOCRACY VERSUS
GUARDIANSHIP 88 (1985).7
3 Id. at 88. Dahl first introduced the idea in AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY
IN A GOOD SOCIETY, supra note 10, at 149; see also ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND
ITS CRITICS 340 (1989).
7 4 JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM 4 (1991).
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for a well-planned DARB designed to do the work of both the
forums and the telephone survey. The monetary and organizational
costs ofa DARB would be substantial, but possibly quite comparable
to what the HSC expended on 47 forums and a statewide poll. In
any case, the end products of the DARB would be far more
valuable. A QWB questionnaire administered to well-briefed,
unhurried DARB participants would be less likely to yield question-
able data, and "community values" derived from their discussions
could not be depicted as the wishes of an unrepresentative elite.
The skills already learned by the Oregon Health Services Commis-
sion, Oregon Health Decisions, and other groups in the community
health decisions movement could easily be applied within the
framework of a DARB. Let us hope that these organizations adopt
the concept, so that the next time citizens are enlisted to influence
difficult issues of health policy, the process will be both deliberative
and fairly representative of the entire community.

